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CASE SUMMARIES
MALEWICZ V. CITY OF AMSTERDAM
362 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2005)

I. INTRODUCTION

In Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia was asked to determine
ownership of a collection of artwork by Kazimir Malewicz. 1 The
artist's heirs presented a claim of expropriation against the City of
Amsterdam, which, at the time, had housed the Malewicz
collection at its Stedelijk Musuem since 1956.2 In 2003, while
fourteen of the works in question were on loan from the Stedelijk
to two museums in the United States, the Malewicz heirs filed suit
in the District
of Columbia seeking return of the artwork and
3
damages.
The district court first sought to determine whether it had
jurisdiction to hear the case in accordance with the Foreign4
Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq.
The Malewicz heirs averred that under Section 1605(a)(3) of the
FSIA, a party could bring suit "against a foreign sovereign when
(1) rights in property were taken in violation of international law,
(2) the property is present in the United States, and (3) the property
has a connection to a commercial activity in the United States
conducted by a foreign state." 5 The court considered each of the
three prongs of the FSIA section in turn. First, the court deemed it
unnecessary to determine whether rights in property were taken in
violation of international law, observing that any "substantial and
non-frivolous" claim provided a basis for consideration of
1.
2.
3.
4.

Malewicz v. City of Amsterdam, 362 F. Supp. 2d 298 (D.D.C. 2005).
Id. at 302.
Id. at 300.
Id. at 306.

5. Id.
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jurisdiction. 6 Next, the court concluded that by filing a claim of
ownership while the artwork was on display in the United States,
the heirs had sufficiently established "presence in the United
States," notwithstanding the fact that the paintings and drawings
had been returned to Amsterdam by the time the case was heard.7
Finally, the court found that Amsterdam's loan of the artwork was
''commercial activity," but stated that the record was insufficient to
determine whether the City's contacts with8 the United States were
sufficient to subject it to FSIA jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the court denied the City's motion to dismiss and
ordered further development of the record to determine whether
the loan of cultural and educational artworks constituted
substantial contact between the City of Amsterdam and the United
States within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1603(e). 9
II. BACKGROUND

After exhibiting over 100 works of art in Berlin in 1927,
Kazimir Malewiczl ° entrusted his canvases to several friends in
Germany for safekeeping and storage." The art could not safely
be returned to Russia because of a Stalinist condemnation of
abstract art. 12 Malewicz died in May of 1935.1 3 By 1937, the
Malewicz works would not have been acceptable for display to the
governments of either Russia or Germany.14 Therefore, the
Malewicz works were shipped to one Mr. Haring for storage in
Berlin, Germany.' 5 Between the years 1951 and 1956, the director
of the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam, as well as other museum
6. Id. at 306-07 (citing Crist v. Republic of Turkey, 995 F. Supp. 5, 10-11
(D.D.C. 1998)).
7. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
8. Id. at 314-15.

9. Id. at 316.
10. Kazimir Malewicz is a world-renowned Russian artist. He worked in the
years prior to World War II and was a significant influence in the history of
abstract art. Id. at 301.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 301.
14. Id.

15. Id.
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directors, tried to persuade Haring to send the Malewicz Collection
to the Stedelijk for restoration and exhibition.' 6 Haring refused to
do so and repeatedly emphasized that he was only responsible for
safekeeping of the canvasses and had no right to convey ownership
of them to anyone. 17 In February 1956, Haring finally agreed to
lend the works to the Stedelijk. 18
A letter sent to the Stedelijk, dated June 23, 1956, signed "on
behalf' of Haring but not by him, announced that under German
law, ownership of the Malewicz works had passed to Haring in
1955.19 The letter also stated that Haing possessed a notarial
exposition of his acquisition of ownership based on a purported
gift causa mortis by Malewicz to Haring of the works left in
Berlin. 20 Therefore, the letter concluded, Haring had the power to
sell the works to Amsterdam. 2 1 In reliance on the letter, the City
of Amsterdam entered into a loan contract with Haring in
November 1956 that contained an option to purchase the Malewicz
Collection.2 2 The City claimed to have exercised that option in
1958.23
The Malewicz heirs filed suit alleging that the letter was
fraudulent and was known as such by the director of the Stedelijk
because of his prior conversations with Haring. 24 Further, the
heirs alleged that Amsterdam and the Stedelijk concealed the
nature of the acquisition, claiming that both knew Haring had no
authority to convey title, had consistently denied such authority,
and had never claimed that Malewicz intended to transfer the
collection to him upon death.25 The heirs first asked Amsterdam
to return the collection to them in 1996.26 The City responded that
its acquisition of the Malewicz Collection was valid and that it had
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 302.
19. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 302.

20. Id.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

Id.

Id.
Id. at 303.
Id.
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
Id.
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become the owner of the Malewicz Collection in 1958. 27 Even if
this were not so, the City continued, it nevertheless became the
owner on January 1, 1993, through 28acquisitive prescription in
accordance with the Dutch Civil Code.
In 2003, fourteen of the eighty-four pieces in the Malewicz
Collection were exported to the United States to be part of a
temporary exhibition of artwork at the Solomon R. Guggenheim
29
Museum in New York City and the Menil Collection in Houston.
These exhibitions were arranged under the terms of the Mutual
Educational and Cultural Exchange Program 30 administered by the
U.S. Department of State.31 Pursuant to the terms of § 2459 of the
State Department's exchange program, the artworks were immune
from seizure and other forms of judicial process that might have
had the purpose or effect of depriving the Guggenheim or the
Menil Collection (or any carrier) of custody or control of the
artworks while in the United States. 32 The Malewicz heirs filed a
complaint two days before the Houston exhibit closed.33 The
artwork was returned to Amsterdam as scheduled, prior to the City
In
being served with notice of the Malewicz' complaint. 34
35
dismiss.
to
motion
a
filed
City
the
response to the complaint,
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
As a preliminary matter, the court noted that the burden of
establishing jurisdiction fell upon the plaintiff.36 The court also
recognized the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act ("FSIA") as the
exclusive means of exercising jurisdiction over foreign sovereigns
(the City of Amsterdam qualified as a foreign sovereign).37 Next,
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id.
Id.
22 U.S.C. § 2459 (2005).
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 305.
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 306.
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the district court stated that a motion to dismiss, when based on a
claim of foreign sovereign immunity, provides protection from suit
and not merely a defense to liability.3 s Thus, the court found that
Amsterdam would be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts
of the United States unless one of the FSIA statutory exceptions
applied to the present case.39 The Malewicz heirs relied upon an
exception that "allows a suit against a foreign sovereign when (1)
rights in property were taken in violation of international law, (2)
the property is present in the United States, and (3) the property
has a connection to a commercial activity in the United States
conducted by the foreign state." 40 The City of Amsterdam moved
to dismiss, arguing that none of the three factors of the §
1605(a)(3) exception could be satisfied. The court noted that the
City bore "the burden of proving that the plaintiffts]' allegations
[did] not bring [their] case within a statutory exception to
immunity., 4 1 In considering its jurisdiction, the court analyzed
each of the three criteria of FSIA § 1605(a)(3) in turn.
A. Were Rights in PropertyTaken in Violation ofInternational
Law?

1.

Clearly InadequateRemedies

The City argued that the Malewicz heirs could not claim an
expropriation in violation of international law in the district court
because they had failed to exhaust their remedies in the courts of
the Netherlands.4 2
The court noted that a claimant cannot
complain that a taking violates international law unless the
claimant has "exhausted domestic remedies in the foreign state that
43
is alleged to have caused the injury."
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3)).
41. Id. at 306 (quoting Phoenix Consulting Inc. v. Republic of Angola, 216
F.3d 36, 40 (D.C. Cir. 2000)).
42. Id.
43. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 307 (quoting Millicom Int'l Cellular v.
Republic of Costa Rica, 995 F. Supp. 14, 23 (D.D.C. 1998)).
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The Malewicz heirs countered by arguing that exhaustion of
local remedies was not required, because remedies available in the
courts of The Netherlands were clearly inadequate. 44 The heirs
argued that the statute of limitations would be a complete defense
if the action were brought in the Netherlands, and the case should
not be dismissed where an alternate
forum (a Dutch court) would
45
not provide an adequate remedy.
The court agreed that an alternative forum in which the plaintiff
46
could recover nothing for a valid claim would not be adequate.
The court held that were the Dutch statute of limitations to bar
plaintiffs claims, Dutch courts would not be a valid alternative
forum.4 7 The court noted that under the laws of the District of
Columbia, it could not require the plaintiffs to take their case to a
Dutch court unless the City of Amsterdam waived its statute-of48
limitations defense and the Dutch court accepted that waiver.
However, the court concluded that the record was factually
insufficient to determine when the Dutch statute of limitations had
begun to9 run, and whether it would ultimately bar Plaintiffs'
4
claims.
2. State Denial of Responsibility
The Malewicz heirs argued that they were not required to file
suit in the Dutch courts because the City "denied any
responsibility., 5 0 The court summarily dismissed this argument by
stating, "[a]lthough the City of Amsterdam has denied that it
violated the rights of the Malewicz Heirs, it does not deny

44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 308 (citing Mills v. Aetna Fire Underwriters Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 8,
13 (D.C. 1986)).
49. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
50. Id. The heirs relied on the proposition that "local exhaustion of remedies
does not apply 'when the claim is for injury for which the respondent state
firmly denies responsibility."' Id. (quoting McKesson Corp. v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, No. 82-220, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8903, at *53 n.25 (D.D.C. June 23,
1997)(aff'd in part & rev'd in part,271 F.3d 1101 (D.C. Cir 2001)).
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'responsibility' for the acquisition of the Malewicz Collection." 5'
The district court found that the City had not denied responsibility
for its actions, but rather the alleged illegality of those
actions. 5 2Therefore, the court held that if the alternative forum
were available, the state "denial" of illegality would not be
sufficient to preclude requiring the heirs to exhaust local
remedies.5 3 While the court's analysis on this point was brief, it
the denial of responsibility from the denial of
clearly distinguished
54
illegality.
B. Was The PropertyPresentin the United States?

1. PhysicalPresence
The City of Amsterdam argued that the artwork was not "present
in the United States" as a matter of fact when the City was
served. 5 Amsterdam likened FSIA § 1605(a)(3) to an in rem
action, arguing that "jurisdiction in an in rem action vests only
upon assertion of judicial authority over the res and not upon the
filing of opening papers."5 6 Thus, the City averred that because
authority over the res could not be obtained by seizure due to the
Immunity from Seizure Act, such authority could not be "regarded
particular service of process in the courts of
as equivalent to5 the
7
law and equity.",
The court disagreed with Amsterdam's argument, stating that it
ignored the "history and purpose of FSIA."'s According to the
court, the State Department adopted a "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity in 1952, whereby a sovereign acting "with
regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of a state" would
be granted immunity, but no immunity would be recognized "with
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
Id.
Id. (quoting Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. 583, 590 (1857)).
Id.
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respect to private acts (jure gestionis).,,5 9 Because of inconsistent
standards in applying restrictive theories of sovereign immunity
between the Executive and Judicial Branches, the court stated,
Congress passed FSIA in 1976 to place "primary responsibility for
interpreting and applying FSIA standards in the Judiciary." 60 The
district court found that FSIA intentionally overrode the commonlaw requirement that a plaintiff obtain in rem
jurisdiction before
61
suit could be filed against a foreign sovereign.
In applying the aforementioned reading of the "history and
purpose" of FSIA, the court stated it "would be anomalous to reinsert the jurisdictional requirements of an in rem action when
Congress so clearly intended to remove them from
consideration." 62 Accordingly, the court held that the Plaintiffs'
filing of the complaint while the artworks were physically present
in the United States was sufficient to meet the "present in the
United States"
factor of FSIA without regard to later service of the
63
complaint.
2. Legal Presence
Amsterdam also argued that the artwork was not present in the
United States as a matter of law during the course of the
exhibitions. 64 The Malewicz heirs could not seek to seize the
artworks while they were in United States due to § 2459
immunity. 65 Moreover, the plaintiffs did not contend that they
could have filed the FSIA suit prior to the importation of the works
or following their departure. 66 The court acknowledged that the
"Plaintiffs [used] the window of opportunity afforded by the
67
Malewicz exhibitions as the jurisdictional hook for their claims."
59. Id. (quoting Verlindin B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480,
486 (1983)).
60. Id.
61. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 309.
65. Id. at 310; see supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
66. Id.
67. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 310 (quoting U.S. Statement at 4).
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The United States, as an interested party, argued that "§ 1605(a)(3)
of FSIA requires a sufficient nexus with the United States to
provide fair notice to foreign states that they are submitting
themselves to U.S. jurisdiction and abrogating their sovereign
immunity. ' 68 However, the district court found the connection
under § 1605(a)(3) to indicate that a foreign state carrying on a
commercial activity in this country and69 not conducting itself as a
sovereign was subject to the exception.
The City argued that the fourteen Malewicz works were
protected from judicial process by § 2459 and therefore not present
in the United States for legal purposes.7 0 However, the court
found that granting immunity under § 2459 and establishing
jurisdiction for certain claims against a foreign sovereign pursuant
to § 1605(a)(3) were "both clear and not inconsistent with one
As such, the court noted it was bound to the plain
another." 7'
meaning of the statutes.7 2 The court approved the reading of the
statutes offered by the Malewicz heirs; specifically, the court held
that the two statutes were "unrelated except that a cultural
exchange might provide the basis for contested property to be
present in the United States and susceptible, in the right fact
pattern, to a FSIA suit."'73 The district court reasoned that a
litigant with a claim against a foreign sovereign may not seize that
sovereign's property that is in this country on a cultural exchange
and may not serve the receiving museum with judicial process as
to interfere with physical custody or control of the works. 74 The
court stated that the Malewicz heirs had attempted neither.75
Accordingly, the court held that the absence of the artworks
from the United States might make a court order to return the
works to the Malewicz heirs "only as valuable as their ability to
persuade a Dutch court to enforce it but, because of § 2459, the

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. (quoting U.S. Statement at 6-7).
Id. at310-11.
Id. at311.
Id.
Id.
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 311.
Id.
Id.
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presence or absence of the property made no difference during the
76
litigation, as long as it was present when [the] suit was filed.,
Thus, the court held that the artworks were "present in the United
States" for purposes of FSIA jurisdiction.77
C. Was There CommercialActivity by the Foreign State?
The Malewicz heirs' complaint stated that the fourteen
Malewicz pieces were in the United States in connection with a
commercial activity carried on in the United States by
Amsterdam. 78 The United States, in a statement filed as an
interested party, advised that "the possibility that such a minimal
level of contact will necessarily suffice to provide jurisdiction
threatens to chill the willingness of sovereign lenders to participate
in the section 2459 program., 79 The City also protested that it was
merely a "lender from a distance"
and not engaged in commercial
80
States.
United
the
in
activity
To begin its analysis, the district court cited the Supreme Court
holding in Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., "[b]ecause the
[Foreign Sovereign Immunity] Act provides that the commercial
character of an act is to be determined by reference to its 'nature'
rather than its 'purpose,' the issue is whether the particular actions
that the foreign state performs (whatever the motive behind them)
are the type of actions by which a private party engages in 'trade
and traffic or commerce."' 81 Thus, the district court reasoned, if
an act is something only sovereigns do, it is not "commercial," and
similarly, if an act is something that a private person or entity can
do, it is not "sovereign";
therefore, "'commercial' means only 'not
82
sovereign."
With this understanding, the court held that it was clear the City
of Amsterdam engaged in "commercial activities" when it loaned
76. Id. at 311-12.
77.
78. Id. at 312.

79. Id.
80. Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 312.
81. Id. at 313 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607

(1992)).
82. Id.
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the fourteen Malewicz works to museums in the United States
since "[t]here is nothing 'sovereign' about the act of lending art
pieces, even though the pieces themselves might belong to a
83
sovereign."
Amsterdam and the United States argued that the City's contacts
with the United States were too insubstantial and insufficient to
expose it to FSIA jurisdiction. 84 They both contended that the
possibility that such a minimal level of contact would necessarily
suffice to provide jurisdiction 5 threatened to chill the entire
international exchange program. .
The district court found that the existing record did not permit
the Court to ascertain the substantiality of the City's contacts or
activities with or in the United States in connection with the loan
of the Malewicz artworks. 86 The court posed a number of
questions that would factor into a calculus of substantiality in this
case: (i) "whether apart from the presence of the artworks
themselves, what were the terms of the loan agreements"; (ii) "did
the Stedelijk send any representatives to this country to work out
arrangements, to travel with the art, or to oversee its safety and
display"; and (iii) "what consideration did the Guggenheim or
Menil Collection offer for the loan-money, a future loan of
American art to The Netherlands, a share in any receipts from
visitors, catalogue sales, and the like-or was this only a courtesy
between professionals in the art world, as the City argues." 87 Prior
to making any determination as to jurisdiction, the court deemed it
necessary to obtain additional information regarding the extent and
the nature of the City of Amsterdam's contacts with the United
88
Accordingly, the court deferred making a jurisdictional
States.
determination, requesting further development of the record.89

83. Id.
84. Id. at 315.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Malewicz, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 315.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 315-16.
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IV. CONCLUSION

The court denied the City of Amsterdam's motion to dismiss so
that the record evidence could be developed relating to the city's
contact with the United States.
The court also instructed
development regarding the first prong of its FSIA § 1605(a)(3)
concerns, namely, whether the Netherlands would waive its statute
of limitations defenses as to provide an alternative forum for the
litigation.

James Drysdale
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